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ABSTRACT. According to the artefactual theory of literature, fictional characters 
are contingently existing abstract objects. Sherlock Holmes, Fyodor Karamazov and 
other creatures of fiction are contingent existents because they are brought into being 
by the creative acts of their authors, and they are abstract objects because they are 
not denizens of the spatiotemporal world. Although the artefactual theory seems to 
correspond to our literary practices, it has some counterintuitive features. The paper 
will propose a modified and more plausible version of artefactualism. The basic idea 
is that fictional characters must be thought of as linguistic representations. After 
analysing the representation-dependent features of authorial creation, I will argue 
that the proposed view helps us to make progress in the debate on the ontological 
status of characters. 
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1. Artefactual Theories of Fictional Characters 
 
One comparative advantage of artefactual theories over their rivals is their 
conformity with our pre-theoretic intuition according to which fictional 
characters are created entities. Everyday consumers of literary works often 
assume that artistic writing is an essentially innovative activity. On the most 
common view, persons like Sherlock Holmes and Fyodor Karamazov, and 
places like Middlemarch and Lilliput are, in the strictest sense of the word, 
intellectual products of the human mind. Fictional characters are therefore 
supposed to have their own life span: there is a certain point of time when 
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they are brought into being by the creative acts of their authors and there 
may come a time when they simply cease to exist, perhaps, when the works 
in which they appear become physically destroyed and no one remembers 
them any more. In this regard, fictional characters do not differ significantly 
from other types of artistic products. It is not very surprising, then, that the 
folk ontogenetic conception of literary works takes the createdness of fictional 
persons and places as a rather obvious and trivial datum. 
 Most proponents of the artefactual theory tend to regard the above onto- 
genetic truisms of the folk view as basically correct. At least two elements of 
this view are thought to be suitable for serious theoretical investigations. The 
first element coincides with the fundamental thesis of art ontological realism 
which states that there are fictional characters in the overall inventory of 
what exists. The second element attempts to give an answer to the question 
of how can there be such characters. According to the folk explanation, 
fictional characters come into being as a result of creative writing processes. 
 Artefactualists such as Goodman (2004), Voltolini (2006) and Thomasson 
(1999, 2003, 2010) argue, in harmony with the folk view, that Sherlock 
Holmes, Middlemarch and their likes are contingently existing created entities. 
Even if this thesis appears to be reasonable at first glance, the artefactual 
theory has some counterintuitive features. On my view, artefactualism 
becomes counterintuitive precisely at that point where it goes beyond the 
truisms of the folk theory. Let me explain what I mean by this.1 
 In order to make their theory plausible, artefactualists have to provide a 
detailed description about the process of authorial creation. If one regards a 
particular fictional text F as consisting of a set of syntactically individuated 
English sentences, then the question for artefactualists to answer is this: How 
can the author of F literally create various fictional entities merely by 
writing down or typing out the sentences composing F? 
 As a first step in answering this question, artefactualists may invoke their 
favored account of intentionality. Thomasson (1996, 1999) follows in this 
respect the act-object theory of intentionality defended first by the polish 
philosophers Twardowski and Ingarden. The act-object theory says that 
every intentional act involves an object and a content. The act is directed or 
related to an object and the content is what is thought or judged about that 
object. According to this approach, non-fictional sentences like (1) receive a 
quite straightforward interpretation: 
 
(1) Günter Grass smokes a pipe. 
 
The object to which the underlying intentional act is related is Grass, and he 
is thought of as acting in a certain way, namely as smoking a pipe. Of 
course, Grass as a person exists independently from any intentional act. And 
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he would surely not cease to exist, if no intentional acts were directed 
towards him in the future. But now consider the fictional counterpart of (1): 
 
(2) Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe. 
 
Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that (2) is the sentence token which 
contained the very first occurrence of the proper name Sherlock Holmes in 
Conan Doyle’s oeuvre.2 Presumably, when Doyle has written down this 
sentence, his intentional act were directed towards a putative object. But 
given that Holmes did not existed before (2) was written down, we may 
question how this was possible. What was the intended object of Doyle’s 
intentional act? If intentionality is essentially relational, as the act-object 
theory assumes, then there is a certain sort of circularity here. Doyle’s 
intentional act presupposed the existence of a particular act-independent 
object, but it seems that the presupposition in question was made by the act 
itself.3 According to Thomasson (1999), this kind of intentional circularity is 
merely apparent. Those who demand an act-independent object in order for 
(2) to have a non-circular interpretation do not take into account the creative 
capacity of intentional acts. We should not deny that Holmes did not exist 
before the tokening of (2). Prior to this time, there was no such person as 
Holmes and no other fictional text contained him (or it) as a protagonist. It 
does not follow from this, however, that (2) has to be regarded as a product 
of an objectless intentional act. Once we recognize that Doyle’s intentional 
act was able to bring into existence its own object, we must also recognize 
that (1) and (2) have a parallel structure. The only difference is that while the 
act underlying (1) is directed towards a previously existing (act-independent) 
object, the act underlying (2) is directed towards an intentionally created 
(act-dependent) object. 
 The observation that certain kinds of intentional act are ontologically 
creative is of crucial importance for artefactualists. This is the observation 
on the basis of which they can argue that fictional characters have extremely 
minimal existence conditions (cf. Thomasson 2003). 
 According to their view, only the following two conditions must be 
satisfied for a particular character to come into existence in a fictional text F: 
(i) the author of F must perform an ontologically creative intentional act that 
is directed towards a previously non-existent object, and (ii) the sentence 
corresponding to the creative act of the author must be included in the set of 
sentences composing F. 
 Our imaginary example seems to satisfy both of these conditions. In the 
foregoing discussion, we have supposed that (2) was the very first thought 
about Holmes in the history of literature. So we have conceived Doyle’s 
intentional act as genuinely creative. We have also supposed that (2) was a 
sentence token which occurred in a fictional text written by Doyle. Since 
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nothing more is required for character creation to succeed, we may conclude 
that in performing (2) Doyle has created a new fictional character. 
 Although Holmes is thought in (2) as smoking a pipe, and in our real 
world only persons are smokers, it would be folly to think that Doyle created 
a person. Fictional characters are not denizens of the spatiotemporal world, 
hence they are not persons. They have a somewhat peculiar ontological 
status. Their existence, as we have seen, depends constitutively on worldly 
processes and entities, like intentional acts and inscriptions, yet they are not 
material in any sense. In this regard, characters belong to the same ontolog- 
ical category as marriages, nations, institutions and other artefacts.4 All of 
these sociocultural entities are contingently existing abstract objects. The 
artefactual theory maintains, accordingly, that Doyle’s creative mental act 
and the corresponding sentence token “Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe” has 
brought into existence an abstractum. 
 But this cannot be the entire explanation, since artefactualists are faced at 
this point with an immediate problem. If Holmes is an abstract object, then 
(2) can be paraphrased or translated, without loss of meaning, into (3): 
 
(2) Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe. 
 
(3) The abstract object created by Conan Doyle smokes a pipe. 
 
Of course, (3) is a nonsensical claim, one to which even the most committed 
adherents of abstract objects could not assent. In attempting to solve this 
problem, artefactualists may follow different strategies. First, they might 
object that the paraphrase is inaccurate because the proper name “Sherlock 
Holmes” and the definite description “the abstract object created by Conan 
Doyle” have different modal profiles. As a rigid designator, the name 
“Sherlock Holmes” refers to the same (abstract) object in all possible worlds. 
Definite descriptions are, however, non-rigid designators, so in some nearby 
worlds it is false that Holmes was created by Doyle. This is a well-known 
objection of the direct reference theory against descriptive sentential para- 
phrases and, as such, it has a standard answer. For example, the modal 
difference between (2) and (3) may be eliminated by applying a suitably 
rigidified version of the definite description. Inserting the actuality operator 
@ or the sentence modifier actually in (3) enables the sentence to express 
the same descriptive content in all of its uses in other possible worlds. Or, to 
achieve the same effect, it might be claimed that the proper name ʻSherlock 
Holmes’ expresses a rigidified descriptive content which remains constant in 
all of its possible tokenings. Artefactualists must therefore find another way 
to solve the problem posed by the above paraphrase. 
 A better proposal is to say that, contrary to its surface appearance, (2) it is 
not an assertion in the usual sense of the word. In fact, this is what Schiffer 
(1996), Thomasson (2003, 2010) and other artefactualists contend. It seems 
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as if Doyle’s original sentence token attributed a property to an (abstract) 
object. But this is just a formal illusion, so to say. Authors of fictional texts 
do not make genuine assertions, they merely pretend to assert what they 
write.5 If it has been made clear that Doyle merely pretended to attribute a 
property to Holmes, then (2) can be paraphrased only in a way that makes 
explicit reference to this pretense. In applying the pretense strategy, the 
artefactualist can easily block the inference from (2) to (3) and say that the 
appropriate candidate for paraphrasing Doyle’s sentence is (4) or something 
similar to it: 
 
(4) Conan Doyle created an abstract object and pretended to assert  
      that it is a person who smokes a pipe. 
 
The core idea, which most realist theories of fiction agree with, is to make a 
significant distinction between two kinds of assertion. Contemporary Mein- 
ongian theories provide perhaps the clearest example of how to motivate this 
distinction. On some neo-Meinongian views, fiction-internal assertions 
attribute nuclear or characterizing properties to fictional objects.6 Assertions 
within the story attribute such nuclear properties to Holmes as smoking a 
pipe or being talented. These are the properties which we associate directly 
with Holmes when we read Doyle’s story. Fiction-external assertions, in 
contrast, attribute extranuclear properties to objects. Among the extranuclear 
properties we find such properties as being fictional or being abstract. Thus, 
if we approach the story from an extra-fictional viewpoint, we may attribute 
to Holmes the property of being an abstract object. Other neo-Meinongians 
maintain that the distinction between fiction-internal and fiction-external 
assertions reflects the ways in which objects may possess their properties. 
While Holmes encodes the property of being a smoker, Günter Grass exem- 
plifies that property. The term “encoding” is meant here to refer to the fact 
that Holmes has this property internally or as a constituent part of his (its) 
own being. The term “exemplifying,” on the other hand, is meant to indicate 
that Grass has the same property externally or non-constitutively. 
 If we now look back to (2), (3) and (4), we will understand the reason why 
artefactualists must subscribe to the fiction-internal/fiction-external distinc- 
tion.7 They hold that fiction-internal assertions are capable to create abstract 
objects; yet at the same time they deny that these objects are literally ascribed 
any properties in the texts in which they occur. The only option which 
remains is thus to say that fiction-internal assertions merely pretend to make 
assertions. Nevertheless, when we literary theorists, linguists or philosophers 
talk about these abstract objects we do not talk about them in the scope of 
pretense. And this, in turn, presupposes that there is a pretense-free, external 
perspective from which we can make genuine assertions about the features 
of fiction-internal discourse. As Thomasson (2003) remarks, fiction-internal 
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occurrences of the proper name “Holmes” are non-referential, but these non-
referential uses enable the name to refer to the character Holmes in external 
discourses. 
 These considerations lead, in the end, to an artefactual theory which 
admits that authors of fictional texts create literally fictional characters, but 
deny that the resulting texts contain literal assertions about these characters. 
This is, to say the least, a bit perplexing. The folk theory seems to be right in 
claiming that fictional texts do not have such contradictory features. In 
engaging with Doyle’s novel, it is a quite natural attitude to take sentences 
like (2) as telling us something about the personality and behavior of the 
character Holmes. Of course, we do not have to give up the artefactual 
theory in its entirety, simply because it conflicts with our ordinary ways of 
thinking about literary characters. This is especially so, if we realize that the 
source of the conflict lies in the conceptual apparatus of the theory. In the 
next two sections, I will argue that a slightly modified understanding of 
artefactualism can provide a non-contradictory view of our engagement with 
fictional texts and fictional characters without relying on the traditional 
fiction-internal/fiction-external distinction. 
 
2. A Representationalist Alternative 
 
At first sight, the act-object theory of intentionality seems to be the obvious 
choice to explain how authors can create new fictional characters. Thomasson 
(1999) thinks of intentional acts as potentially creative, so she can con- 
vincingly argue that certain kinds of authorial act bring into existence new 
intentional objects. The resulting art-ontological view holds, then, that fic- 
tional characters exist as dependent abstracta. As we have already indicated 
earlier, the creation of Holmes is thought of as depending both on the 
ontologically productive mental act performed by Doyle and the sentence 
token which corresponds to Doyle’s act. 
The second part of the latter claim, however, rests on a questionable 
presupposition concerning the semantics of fictional sentences. In order to 
understand correctly what this presupposition amounts to, let us consider 
once again what the artefactualist has to say about the ontological relation 
between characters and the sentence tokens on which their coming into 
existence and their continued existence is (partly) dependent. Given their 
realist ontological commitments and their accompanying ideas about contin- 
gently existing abstract objects, artefactualists have to distinguish characters 
from literary texts in which their names are (first) mentioned. Although their 
existence conditions include facts about linguistic objects, fictional characters 
are supposed to be abstracta which are not linguistic by their nature. But, 
then, what kind of abstract object are they? Voltolini (2006) identifies them 
 74 
with compound abstract entities. On Voltolini’s view, characters are consti- 
tuted by an instantiated make-believe process-type and a fiction-internally 
ascribed set of properties. Thomasson who also denies the linguistic nature 
of characters, proposes another possible account, namely that they are onto- 
logically similar to marriages, laws and other abstract cultural artefacts (cf. 
Thomasson 1999, 2003). From a Thomassonian point of view, the linguistic 
object – the token name “Holmes” – used by Doyle for expressing his creative 
thought and the resulting Holmes-artefact are related but distinct objects. 
They are related because they are dependent on exactly the same mental 
basis, namely on Doyle’s intentional acts. Yet they are distinct, because they 
are instances of different kinds of abstractum. 
Unfortunately, these conceptions presuppose rather than explain the onto- 
logical status of characters. The core problem may be stated in the following 
way. The semantic content of Doyle’s sentence token and the Holmes-artefact 
are arguably different kinds of abstract object. If the Holmes-artefact is (partly) 
dependent on but not identical with the semantic content of the sentence token 
(2), then there must be a causal or inferential relation actually connecting 
them. But so far neither Voltolini nor Thomasson have attempted to explain 
how this relation could be defined in an artefactualist framework. Moreover, 
the available linguistic data do not seem to support such an explanation.8 
I think the simplest way to get rid of this problem is to hold that Sherlock 
Holmes is nothing more than a linguistic construct. Let us say that the sen- 
tence token “Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe” represents Holmes as being a 
certain way. Doyle’s sentence represents Holmes as smoking a pipe, so we 
may say that it offers us a particular Holmes-representation. Note that the 
term “representation” is used here in a specific, non-relational way. There is 
nothing new in this usage. In recent years, various attempts have been made 
in the relevant philosophical and linguistic literature to develop a non-
relational interpretation of representation.9 For example, Burge (2010) points 
out that representation can transpire even in cases where there is nothing that 
could be represented. In Burge’s jargon, representing is always representing-
as-of. A predicate or a proper name X has this underlying structure 
independently of whether there is a candidate for being a representatum of X. 
Sainsbury (2012) is of the same opinion when he remarks that the claim “X 
represents Y” does not imply that there is something, Y, such that X repre- 
sents it. In this sense, representing Holmes is not equivalent with expressing 
a singular proposition containing Holmes as a constituent. A sentence token 
can represent Holmes as a smoker even if there is no such person as Holmes. 
Moreover, the Holmes-representation is interpretable without any reference 
to language-independent objects, be they concrete or abstract. It is tantamount 
to say that fictional characters come into being as self-standing, non-
relational linguistic representations. 
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 Now we can take a further step in this direction. Doyle’s novel represents 
Holmes in a great variety of ways – as being a smoker, as being a detective, 
as living on Baker Street, and so forth. Thus, if Doyle is the author of the 
fictional text F, then Holmes can be identified in F with the elements of the 
property set P, where P = {p1, p2, … pn}, and p1, p2, … and pn are the 
properties explicitly represented by the sentences of F. 
 According to F, Holmes is a smoker. We know, however, that smokers 
often have lungs that are gross and black. So Holmes may also have gross 
and black lungs. But F is absolutely silent about this matter. F represents 
him neither as having gross and black lungs, nor as having healthy lungs. 
This is not to say that Holmes is an incomplete representation, it means 
simply that he is not explicitly represented either way. But some elements of 
the property set P may jointly imply that he has healthy lungs. Then, it 
would be certainly correct to state that Holmes is represented implicitly as 
having healthy lungs. Compare this with the case when someone claims that 
Holmes is a computer program. We would definitively reject this claim by 
saying that Holmes is represented neither explicitly nor implicitly as a com- 
puter program in F. 
 In order to decide such cases we may introduce the property set P*, where 
P* = {p*1, p*2, … p*n}, and p*1, p*2, … p*n are the implicit properties 
derived from P through an appropriately designed interpretative method M. 
Since it is not a trivial task to develop such a method as M, we must be con- 
tent to assume that it can in principle be developed. Under this assumption, 
the Holmes-representation of F may be seen as completely determined by 
the property sets P and P*. Or, in other words, thinking about Holmes means 
nothing else than mobilizing a non-relational representational complex com- 
bined from certain elements of P and P*. This does not mean that Holmes is 
a set-correlate of the union of P and P*, since we cannot ascribe properties 
to fictional characters: characters cannot be subsumed under the traditional 
ontological category of language-independent objects. The central claim is, 
rather, that Holmes exists in F as a maximal representational combination of 
the elements of P and P*. 
It is important to keep in mind that the terms “property” and “property 
set” are not used here in their neo-Meinongian sense. We can say, if we like, 
that in writing his novel Doyle ascribes a particular property (say, being a 
smoker) to his protagonist. But this idiom is to some extent misleading, since 
in the context of F, property-ascribing predicates like “is a smoker” can 
acquire only non-relational interpretations. There is no language-independent 
object (Holmes) to which the text may ascribe a language-independent 
property (being a smoker). Thus, in contrast to the neo-Meinongian theory 
which conceives property attribution as a relational act, the present view 
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acknowledges properties only at the level of non-relational linguistic repre- 
sentation.  
 At this point, the following objection may be raised. If Holmes is a 
linguistic representation created by Doyle, then we are back where we 
started. The problem now seems to be that we are forced to accept (5) as a 
correct paraphrase of (2):  
 
(5) The Holmes representation created by Conan Doyle smokes a pipe. 
 
Undoubtedly, (5) sounds as bad as (3). But (5) is misleading in that it makes 
it seem as if the property of smoking a pipe were a property of the Holmes 
representation. This cannot be the correct interpretation. Being a member of 
P, the property of smoking a pipe is in fact a constitutive part of the Holmes 
representation of F. Hence it is incorrect to think that Doyle’s creative act 
ascribed a property to an abstract linguistic construct. We can avoid this 
misleading interpretation by focusing on the physical basis of the Holmes-
representation: 
 
(6) The sentence token created by Conan Doyle  
      represents Holmes as smoking a pipe. 
 
(6) reveals two things about the circumstances under which the fictional 
character Holmes was created. First, Doyle’s intentional act was ontologically 
productive because it created a particular mental representation. One may 
conjecture that this mental representation was the original content of his 
creative act. This content can be seen, in turn, as the way in which he created 
that mental representation. The “way” of the creative act can be described 
adequately by an adverbial phrase: Sherlock Holmes was represented in 
Doyle’s thought in a smoking-a-pipe-wise.10 Or, more correctly, we can say 
that Doyle performed a mental act in a Sherlock-Holmes-smokes-a-pipe-
wise. This particular way of thinking was what individuated the content of 
the creative act in question. Second, in order to successfully expressing his 
thought in a publicly accessible form, Doyle must have written down the 
sentence “Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe.” Hence it is not unreasonable to 
think that this token sentence acquires its content from the mental act that 
immediately precedes it. And given that the mental act represents Holmes in 
a non-relational manner, the token sentence must represent Holmes in a non-
relational manner, too. The result of the writing act can thus be regarded as 
the physical endpoint of character creation. There is no need for supplement- 
ing this account with a further inferential step: (2), just as it is in itself, is able 
to bring into being Holmes as a publicly accessible non-relational repre- 
sentation. 
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3. In Closing 
 
It thus seems that there is little reason to reject the artefactual theory of fic- 
tional characters. Paradigmatic examples of fictional creatures like Sherlock 
Holmes, Fyodor Karamazov or Madame Bovary are contingently existing 
abstract objects. Artefactualists are fundamentally right in their emphasis on 
the created nature of these entities. But I think we remain closer to the folk 
view if, contrary to standard artefactualism, we regard fictional characters as 
linguistic representations. 
 One obvious advantage of this revised version of the artefactual theory is 
that the terminological distinction between fiction-internal and fiction-external 
assertions becomes superfluous. Consider first the easy case in which someone 
tries to understand what a fiction-internal sentence asserts. When we read the 
sentence “Holmes is a detective,” we come to know that Holmes is repre- 
sented in the text as being a detective. This is a natural-sounding interpreta- 
tion. A much harder case is when we read the apparently fiction-external 
sentence “Holmes is a fictional character.” Does the interpretation of this 
sentence actually involve an external perspective? It is not necessarily so. It 
just needs to be recalled what the term “fictional character” means in the 
present context. According to the present account, fictional characters are 
linguistic representations. And the term “representation” is intended to mean, 
in turn, “to be represented in a certain way.” Thus, the sentence “Holmes is a 
fictional character” informs us that Holmes is represented in the text as being 
a certain way. It does not provide a particular representation; rather, it 
reminds us that Doyle’s character has a representational nature. Since this 
seems to be in agreement with the former result, one may conclude that 
Holmes is seen through the same interpretative perspective in both cases.  
 A further and related advantage of the present proposal is that it does not 
entail the controversial claim according to which authors of fictional texts 
merely pretend to make assertions. The pretense approach to authorial asser- 
tions is used by Thomasson and other artefactualists as a last resort. Its only 
role is to assure us that fiction-internal assertions do not concern abstracta. 
But once one thinks of the fiction-internal/fiction-external distinction as 
theoretically insignificant, even this limited role seems likely to evaporate 
altogether. Thomasson and her followers are right in saying that authorial 
assertions do not ascribe properties to abstract artefacts. From a represen- 
tationalist point of view, however, one can provide a complete explanation 
for this phenomenon without involving the notion of authorial pretense.  
 The present proposal requires only a light revision of the standard 
artefactualist framework. It leaves untouched the abstract status of fictional 
characters, but makes an attempt to state more precisely what kind of 
abstract objects they are. The core idea is that fictive individuals in literary 
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artworks like Sherlock Holmes, Fyodor Karamazov and Madame Bovary are 
to be thought as non-relational linguistic representations. Though I am fairly 
well convinced that this idea allows a simpler and more uniform theoretical 
treatment of fictional discourse, some important details may be lacking.11 
Arguably further analysis is required to account for the naturalness of the 
representationalist view: is it indeed the case that everyday consumers of 
literary works think of fictional characters in terms of representation? But 
this will be the subject of another paper. 
 
NOTES 
 
1. The most elaborated and consistent version of the artefactual theory is to be 
found in Thomasson (1999). In responding to her critics, Thomasson has revised 
some of her original ideas over the years (cf., Thomasson 2003, 2010). In what 
follows, I shall focus primarily on her view in my discussion. 
2. In fact, the proper name Sherlock Holmes occurs for the first time in the novel 
A Study in Scarlet (1887/2004). The first sentence which contains the name is to be 
found on page 5: “You don't know Sherlock Holmes yet.ˮ 
3. For similar observations, see Yagisawa (2001) and Brock (2010). The charge 
of circularity is not completely unfounded, but this is irrelevant for the present pur- 
poses. I shall argue for a version of artefactualism that avoids this problem entirely. 
4. See Thomasson (2003). Voltolini (2006) provides also an insightful analysis 
of the ontological category of created abstracta. 
5. It is worth to note that artefactualists borrow the idea of pretense from anti-
realist theories which deny the existence of fictional characters. This is not a problem 
in itself. But it is hard to understand how can Doyle intend to create literally an 
object if he merely pretends to assert something. Wouldn’t it be more appropriate to 
claim that he pretends to create an object? I think it is a legitimate question, but to 
answer it would require a separate study. 
6. On the differences between Neo-Meinongian theories see, for example, Zalta 
(1992). 
7. Anti-realist theories of fictional characters must also adopt some variant of 
this distinction, because they have to explain how we can talk about fictional char- 
acters in spite of the fact that they do not exist. On this theme, see Friend (2007). 
8. According to Kertész and Rákosi (2012), linguistic data can be considered to 
be more or less reliable “truth-candidates.” Data are supported by their sources only 
to a certain extent, hence they are not true with certainty. And similarly, theoretical 
claims is linguistics are usually not true with certainty, but more or less plausible. If 
we follow this account, the artefactualist’s claim can be regarded as having a low 
plausibility value. 
9. See, among others, Sainsbury (2012) and Azzouni (2013). 
10. Following Kriegel (2008), we may call this account content adverbialism. On 
this account, thoughts about fictionalia are related to representational contents, but, 
and this is the main point, representational contents in themselves are not relational. 
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11. One of the central issues which must be adressed by artefactualists concerns 
the problem of name-introduction procedures. Adherents of the artefactual theory 
typically think that a certain version of the baptism-based theory of ordinary proper 
names is able to provide an account also for fictional names. Of course, the baptism-
based theory cannot be straightforwardly adopted to fictional cases because of the 
absence of objects which could be baptized. One possible solution is to follow 
Thomasson (1999), who argues that characters acquire their names in a quasi-
indexical way. For more details of this topic, see, among others, Braun (2005) and 
Lamarque (2010). 
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